Heroism is a valued part of any society, yet its realization depends on the decisions of individual actors and a public reward to individuals who undertake heroic actions. Military combat related activities provide a useful starting point for thinking about the empirical nature of heroism. Interestingly, if we define heroism by those who have been awarded military honors such as the Congressional Medal of Honor, the number of heroes has actually fallen in the past 35 years. We develop a theory to explain heroism in a rational decision-making framework, and we model the case in which individuals respond to danger to themselves and others based on the costs and benefits associated with acts of courage. We also provide insight into how a government may wish to optimally subsidize heroic actions. We then use our model to understand why the observed decline in heroism can be explained as both an optimal individual and social response, rather than as an arbitrary change in the stinginess on the part of the government to reward heroism.
Introduction
Under what circumstances would you undertake a heroic action? Would you risk life or limb to save another? Lord Tennyson's Charge of the Light Brigade indicates that a soldier's heroic duty entails that "Their's not to reason why, Their's but to do or die", suggesting that the motivation for heroic actions comes from something beyond reason or rationality. In fact, most studies that address heroism focus on psychological or philosophical motivations for action in battle. For example Gat (1999) , Horowitz (2001) , and Stern (1995) describe how an attack, or even the threat of attack, can motivate individuals to overcome the instinct of flight versus fight. Others such as Johnson et al (2006) describe how overconfidence can lead some to overestimate their abilities and act in a heroic manner. Other authors, e.g. Smirnov, et al (2007) , also avoid rational explanations for heroism, by investigating how ancestral war and evolution have "hardwired" heroism into society.
Alternatively, there could be another explanation for heroic actions, an economic one, rooted in individual self-interest and public incentives. We construct a simple economic model to explain heroism. Our purpose is to use the model to understand the data -heroism during war -and compare the model's predictions to the empirical regularities associated with the Congressional Medal of Honor (CMH) distribution. We find that an economic, incentive based model of heroism can be useful for understanding and explaining the empirical regularities of heroism.
We measure heroism using military actions, because this is one of the most consistently observed individual measures of heroism. Using the Congressional Medal of Honor recipients' data for measured heroic actions, we find three major facts. First, the number of war heroes has declined over time. This empirical finding also holds when we control for the number of troops deployed, and the number of deaths in the battlefield. By implication, this suggests that the probability of being a hero declines with time. Second, the probability that a hero survives his/her heroic act has declined with time and since Vietnam War has become zero. Third, the likelihood of heroism is higher in smaller theatres.
Theoretically, we interpret heroic acts within the context of individual decision making, public rewards, and the coordination of individual decisions.
1 Conceptually, we consider the issue of a bomb that is tossed into the middle of a room, where each individual must decide whether he/she should dive on the bomb to protect others, or hope that someone else does. In equilibrium, we derive the individual likelihood of heroism and the expected number of heroes as a function of the private costs and benefits to action, and the public reward to heroism. We then derive the optimal public subsidy to ensure that, in expectation, society has the optimal number of heroes. Importantly, using our model we then consider how technological change in conflict -i.e. the efficacy of bombs, the extent of collateral damage and the labor intensity of heroism -and technological change in general -i.e. the rise in living standards which could lower heroism if heroism is an inferior good -have evolved and how this explains the observed equilibrium behavior of heroism. Finally, we use the model to provide an economic interpretation of the data on heroism.
We illustrate our theory of heroism in the analytics of aggregate supply and demand. We note that an increase in lifetime utility or income raises the opportunity cost of heroism which, ceteris paribus, should reduce the supply of heroes. Moreover, we note that an improvement in countermeasures for surviving combat will also cause the supply curve to shift toward reduced levels of heroism. Taken together, these effects lead to a reduction in the number of heroes, which helps explain the first empirical regularity.
Second, we show that an increase in the technological efficacy of bomb-making raises the costliness of behaving heroically. This will lead to a higher likelihood of deaths for heroes and a reduction in the supply for heroes, again due to rising opportunity costs.
These forces explain the second empirical regularity. Finally we note that the supply of heroes should fall as the size of the combat theatre expands because there is greater temptation to free-ride in the coordination game for heroism. This explains the remaining empirical regularity.
Of course, there could be readers who wish to accept the empirical evidence that there is a decline in the number of heroes while simply dismissing our economic-based explanation for the following reason: namely, for whatever arbitrary reason, the government decided to reduce the number of recipients. While this possibility exists that the government has capriciously become stingy about honoring heroism, one of the main contributions to this paper is that we establish a positive explanation for why the government should have changed its policy for rewarding heroism. Indeed, our theory describes why individuals may wish to behave heroically less often (supply) and why the government may wish there to be fewer heroes (demand) based on changing technologies and opportunity costs. Ultimately, we believe that economists prefer explanations of social phenomenon based on economic theory as compared to those based merely on caprice or whim.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we report the empirical regularities of Congressional Medal of Honor recipients. To help provide an economic context to understand these stylized facts, in Section 3 we outline our baseline model that demonstrates the economic influences on equilibrium heroic behavior. In Section 4, we then use the theory to provide an illustration for observed heroism. The final section offers concluding remarks.
Three Empirical Regularities of Heroism
In this section we establish the simple empirical regularities of U.S. heroism. We define a hero as a recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor (CMH). There are three main findings in the data. First, the number of heroes has declined over time. This finding holds even when we control for the number of troops deployed and the number of deaths associated with battle intensity. Second, the probability that a hero survives his/her heroic act has declined -namely, heroes are now very likely to die in action. Third, the likelihood of heroism is greater in smaller campaigns than in big ones. After establishing 2 Some might suggest that our model provides a description of insurgent or terrorist behavior in which volunteers undertake suicide missions, and do so in the context of a clearly identified reward system for themselves and/or their descendents. Such an interpretation, however, would warrant a thorough examination of a terrorist organization's raison d'etre and the technology of such insurgent tactics, which are beyond the scope of this paper.
these data regularities, we demonstrate how our model can be used to explain the data.
Consider the first fact mentioned -the decline in the number of heroes. In all the Table 1A describes the war/conflict in chronological order. 7 The second column reports the number of CMH recipients for each war. To provide a metric for the size of the conflict, column three reports the number of troops deployed during the war.
Moreover, to gauge the carnage of each war, column's four and five report the number of battle deaths of U.S. military personnel (Column 4) and the number or awards given posthumously (Column 5). Table 1B repeats the same information for each war, but provides the probabilities associated with being a hero (Column 2), the fraction of heroes per battle death (Column 3), and the fraction of heroes who die while acting heroically (Column 4).
There are three main facts to be seen in Tables 1A and 1B Clearly, the negatively sloped relationship indicates that larger conflicts, which typically involve more battle deaths, tend to have a lower ratio of heroes.
Third, during the more recent period, heroes are much more likely to die in battle.
As Table 1B shows, in all wars before World War I, less than 10 percent of heroes died in battle. In World War I through Vietnam the probability increased from 26 percent to 60-70 percent. Since then, every hero has been killed in battle. Figure 3 plots the percent of CMH recipients that were awarded posthumously. There has been a noticeable increase in the percent awarded posthumously beginning during World War I. Since then, the rate has continued to increase until every winner of the CMH since 1991 has died heroically. 
Theoretical Considerations
The purpose of our model is two-fold. First, we characterize and establish an economic language for understanding heroism based on self-interest, rational decision making, incentives and coordination. Second, based on our model, we then interpret the empirical regularities.
The Simple Hero Model
The mechanics of our game are simple. It is a simultaneous one-shot game in which individuals choose whether or not to engage in heroism subject to their 9 There were no recipients of the CMH during the 1991 Gulf War, and hence none were awarded posthumously.
endowments and technologies. We demonstrate that initially, without government intervention, no one should behave heroically. The government plays a role of inducing heroism in our model in that it subsidizes heroic activity. We show that, due to the coordination problem, the government should neither under nor over-subsidize heroism.
We then extend the model to allow for risk tolerance and varying technologies.
Qualitatively, the results are not affected by these extensions.
Consider the scenario in which there is a group of n identical people, each with expected lifetime utility V, whose lives are potentially in jeopardy. Each person prefers that the life threatening emergency situation be resolved, but also prefers that someone else put their life in harm's way in order to save everyone else. For illustrative purposes, consider the extreme scenario in which a grenade is rolled into a confined area.
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Suppose that each person receives utility V, expected lifetime utility, if the situation is resolved and bears the cost of 1 α V if he takes the action (dives on the grenade). In the extreme case of death, an individual would receive no more lifetime utility, so that 1 α = 1.
Assume also that if no one takes any action then everyone suffers a cost from collateral damage, 2 α V, such that the expected utility attached to this event is V-2 α V. We assume
The payoff matrix for any two arbitrary players, i and j, for all j ≠ i, is given below in Table1. 10 According to Holmes (1985, p. 300) , "Of the eight medals won by Marines on Peleliu in 1944, six were awarded to men who covered grenades with their bodies to save their comrades…." Also, in a history of the US Marine Corps by Robert Moskin, it is stated that "Five black Marines earned the Medal of Honor in Vietnam. All five were killed shielding their fellow Marines from exploding enemy grenades." Not all who did this were actually killed; Holmes reports that two winners of the Medal of Honor in Korea survived having thrown themselves on grenades. Yet the risk of death from such action is, clearly, very high. 11 The situation in which 2 1 0 α α ≤ ≤ describes a scenario in which one will suffer more if he is not acting than acting, condition on the fact that no one else is acting. This is not compatible with characterizing representing a heroism scenario, a situation in which people would prefer not to take such actions. 
Notes: Each cell refers to two payoffs, separated by a comma. The first payoff listed is for player i, whose decision is labeled in the first column. The second payoff listed is for player j, for all j ≠ i, whose decision is labeled in the top row.
Without government intervention, a unique Nash equilibrium exists in which no one takes any action. Simply put, not acting is a weakly dominant strategy. In this case, there may be market failure if social welfare under the Nash equilibrium is less than it would be if a single person were to take action, which reduces to the restriction that 2 1 α α n < .
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In order to improve social welfare, the government needs to change the relative price of heroism in order to provide incentives to encourage action. One way the government may do this would be to recognize someone as a hero and give him status in society -a title, such as the Congressional Medal of Honor, and/or a stipend. Not every one that acts will get this reward; however, the expected utility gain from acting associated with these benefits is g. Please note that the perceived private benefit must be
, as otherwise there will be no change in the behavior. 13 This yields the following payoff matrix for any two players as shown in Table 2: 12 If no one acts, the total welfare under the Nash equilibrium is
On the other hand, if a single person will take action the total welfare will be
. Rearranging these terms yield the above criteria. 13 One might consider extending the model to allow changes in information technology and the media to affect the decision to be a hero by their effect on g. For instance, full information might diminish the value of heroism due to unwanted intrusion into military operating procedures and/or an individual's privacy. Second, the national media may highlight certain heroic acts, thereby elevating the perceived reward from heroism, g. From our modeling perspective, however, these are exogenous to the government's decision that determines g. 
Since this is a symmetric simultaneous-play game, there are n pure Nash equilibria in which exactly one person takes action. 14 In contrast to the equilibrium without a public subsidy, if a person believes no one will act, he prefers to act heroically.
Furthermore, if there is no mechanism to ensure coordination, every player uses the same mixed strategy. In this case, a player is indifferent between taking action and not taking action, if the following is satisfied:
The left hand side is the expected payoff to individual i for acting, and the right hand side is the expected payoff to individual i for not acting.
Denote by p the probability that each person takes action. The probability that no one else takes action is the probability that every one of the other n-1 people does not take action, namely The proof of the proposition is obtained from straightforward differentiation.
Note that p* is affected in the following way: V, g, n) .
Increases in the value of 1 α , the cost of action parameter, and V, the utility value of an unharmed life, decrease the probability that someone will be a hero. The former affect is straightforward, since an increase in the cost of an action typically leads to a decline in the probability that an individual will want to undertake that particular action. The latter affect is merely about opportunity cost: namely, a rise in the value of an unharmed life, V, reduces the net benefit of acting heroically.
Proposition 1 provides the prediction that as technology has rapidly progressed during the later part of the twentieth century, heroism should have fallen -i.e. the rise in living standards which could affect heroism if heroism is an inferior good (increases in 1 α and V ) should decrease the incentive to behave heroically. Proposition 1 is also noteworthy in that it requires a self-interested rationale to link rising standards of living to declines in heroism. Our approach is novel as other non-economic models do not link heroism and opportunity costs.
It is also worthwhile to note that, an increase in both g and 2 α increases the probability that someone will be a hero. This involves a straightforward argument about incentives. If the government raises the expected payoff to an individual to act heroically, or if the cost of not acting rises, then it would be in the best interest of a selfinterested agent to increase the probability of acting heroically.
for p yields the above condition, which we label p*.
Finally, increases in the group size necessarily reduce the probability that any one individual will take heroic action. Namely, increases in n will reduce p. Given the linkage of this theoretical prediction to the empirical regularities pointed to above, we demonstrate this in the proposition below.
Proposition 2: Ceteris Paribus, an increase in n decreases p.
Derivation of (2) The importance of Proposition 2 is that we are able to use our theory to fit another one of our three empirical regularities -namely, smaller campaigns, i.e. those with lower n, should have a higher fraction of heroes. Moreover, an increase in the group size reduces the probability that at least one person will take action. Recall that the probability that no one will take action is
. Intuitively, as the group size rises, the coordination problem intensifies which reduces the likelihood of heroic action. This latter point is not trivial and might be counter intuitive. When group size increases two opposite forces affect the expected number of heroes, np*. On the one hand, the probability that each individual will take action is declining. On the other hand, there are more people and the expected number of heroes has a binomial distribution with expected value of np*. Generally speaking, if * p is small enough, then the expected number of heroes will decline as n rises. 16, 17 16 Note that In summary, the subsection provides several implications from our model that are consistent with the three empirical regularities. First, we show that the probability of being a hero should decline with time (as 1 α and V have increased over time). Second, we
show that the probability of behaving heroically should be greater in smaller theatres (as increases in n decrease the likelihood of behaving heroically). The model also provides implications for the third empirically regularity -that recent heroes die in battle. One way to explain this stylized fact is to consider how the cost of acting heroically may have changed in the most recent period. This argument is based on improvements in military technology (which should increase 1 α ). If we accept that such improvements have caused the parameter to approach its limiting value, 1 α = 1, it follows that all heroes who do exhibit bravery will die.
The Optimal Reward for Heroism
Finally, to close the model, we consider the optimal size of g selected by the government. If g is too small no one will act. On the other hand, if g is too large, there will be too many heroes, in excess of what is socially optimal. Given our model assumptions, the expected number of people that take action is np*, which is equal to:
To recall, the socially optimal number of heroes is one.
18 Therefore, an optimizing government chooses g such that: . 18 We define the social welfare as the sum off all individual utilities. In that case, the social welfare is
where j=0 (the number of people that take action) and it is
. Clearly, total welfare is maximized when j=1.
As n grows arbitrarily large, the right hand term of equation (6) Solving for optimal g* yields:
Note that for a large population, the optimal government welfare subsidy for heroism is a constant fraction of V. Note that as α 1 and V rise and α 2 declines, the optimal reward for heroism rises. In words, as the utility value of life or the individual cost to heroic action rises, the optimal government subsidy to heroism needs to rise. Moreover, as individual costs from inaction rise, the optimal public reward can fall as an individual needs fewer incentives to act heroically. We will discuss the implications for this in Section 4.
Model Extensions and Modifications
In this subsection, we relax some of the modeling assumptions to examine if the results are sensitive to our specifications. We consider the possibility of a different cost structure, that individuals have varying risk tolerances, and that labor intensity shifts due to military technological progress. We demonstrate below that the predictions of our model continue to be consistent with a public goods argument for heroism without changing any of our qualitative predictions.
Additive Costs
We continue to assume a similar setup. We assume that each person attaches the utility of V if the situation is resolved but bears the cost of 1 C if he takes the heroic action. If no one takes action, everyone suffers a cost, 2 C , such that the expected utility attached to this event is V-2 C . We assume that 0
. 19 The payoff matrix with government intervention for any two arbitrary players, say i and j, is given below. 
In this case, we assume that 0
(otherwise no one will act). Again, if we define p as the probability with which each person takes action, and use the fact that in mixed strategy equilibrium a player will be indifferent between acting and not acting, we could solve
Similar to the previous subsection, the probability of acting in the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium is: All the results from the previous case are qualitatively similar. The only difference is that now the probability of acting does not depend on V. This is due to the additive property of costs such that V is part of each individual payoff. This is equivalent to adding a constant to the payoff which results in the vanishing of V from the equilibrium mixed strategy probabilities.
Risk Aversion
We now introduce risk aversion by assuming von Neumann Morgenstern utility preferences, the payoff matrix now represents the utility from payments, where V is expected lifetime income, and 1 C and 2 C are defined to be monetary costs. We will use the previous example's notation since the results are qualitatively the same for the baseline model. However, introducing von Neumann Morgenstern utility will keep V as a parameter in the mixed strategy equilibrium. To see this, we continue to assume
. The payoff matrix for any two arbitrary players, say i and j, in terms of the utility function U, is given below. 
Notes: Each cell refers to two utilities, separated by a comma. The first utility listed is for player i, whose decision is labeled in the first column. The second utility listed is for player j, for all j ≠ i, whose decision is labeled in the top row.
Again, if we define p as the probability with which each person takes action, and use the fact that in a mixed strategy equilibrium a player will be indifferent between acting and not acting, we can solve )
for p*. Similar to the previous case, the probability of acting in the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium is:
In this case, we find that the relationship between the probability of acting and the model parameters continue to hold as demonstrated in expression (3).
The Labor Intensity of Heroic Action
Up to this point, our theory has focused on the case when only one hero is needed to efficiently and optimally resolve, from a social perspective, an incident. More generally, alternative scenarios could be considered where `k' individuals would be needed simultaneously to act heroically. Indeed, due to the historic nature and evolution of conflict technologies, it is likely that combat now places a greater reliance on physical capital and fewer contributions of labor for heroic acts. By contrast, in the past heroic actions may have been such that often more than one hero was needed for any given incident, k>1.
Consider the scenario where "k bombs" roll into a room and society needs at least k people to dive on the bombs. The idea is that technological progress has reduced k over time so that for the k-bombs case, k>1, we are considering represents military warfare in a previous era. In the past, fighting was a labor intensive task such that in order to solve a problem you needed many volunteers. With time, due to technology progress, the number of people required to act heroically to defuse a bomb situation has likely declinedindeed, even robots have now been developed for such task. 
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The payoff matrix for player i with government subsidy g depends on the number of people that will act in the following way: 
Notes: Each cell refers to the payoff to player i. The first column of payoffs presents the payoff to player i if at least k individuals take action, while the second column of payoffs presents the payoff to player i if fewer than k individuals act. 20 The assumption about payoffs in this version of the model is made to simplify the model. Other reasonable alternatives provide similar results, though with additional, more cumbersome notation. 21 If this is the case the total welfare under the Nash equilibrium is
On the other hand, if k persons will take action the total welfare will be
. Rearranging these terms yield the above criteria.
Since it is a symmetric, simultaneously played game, there are
pure Nash equilibria in which exactly k persons take action. Again, if there is no mechanism to ensure coordination, in a symmetric equilibrium every player uses the same mixed strategy. In this case, a player is indifferent between taking action and not taking action, if the following is satisfied:
The left hand side is the expected benefit from acting. The right hand side is the benefit from not acting when too few others act, multiplied by the probability that too few act, plus the benefit from not acting when enough act, multiplied by the probability that enough people will act.. Again, if we denote by * p the probability with which each person take action, it must satisfy the following equation:
Unfortunately, expression (12) does not have a closed form solution for p*. 22 We would like to find, however, the effect of changing k on the expected demand and supply of heroes. We will demonstrate below that an increase in k leads to an increase in the probability that an individual will act heroically. Namely increasing the number of bombs will increase the probability that any individual will take action. The intuition for this result is that increasing the number of bombs reduces the coordination problem because more individuals are needed to act heroically.
Proposition 3: Ceteris Paribus, an increase in k increases p*.
Proof: The proof follows in two pieces. In part A we show that the left hand side of expression (12) is decreasing in p*. We then show in part B that an increase in k, increases p* by directly calculating the derivative.
A. The left hand side of expression (12) is decreasing in p, namely:
22 Even if we restrict ourselves only to the case where k=2 we cannot solve this equation for p* for an arbitrary n. We can, however, solve this equation analytically for p* only when n is less than or equal to 5.
(13) 0
This follows from the fact that the binomial cumulative distribution function is monotonic and non-decreasing. Hence, increasing p leads to a binomial distribution that is stochastically dominates over the same support for any k.
B.
Recall that the definition of the derivative of p with respect to k is the change in p when k increases by one unit. Denote by k p the probability that satisfies the equilibrium condition (12) for the k bomb case, and similarly denote by 1 + k p the probability that satisfies (12) for the k+1 bomb case. Hence, it follows that both conditions satisfy the same constant, namely:
So that by expending the right hand side of expression (14) we get:
It follows that Note that the fact that p decreases as k decreases suggests that if conflict technologies change which lead k to fall, we should see a lower likelihood that any one individual soldier will be a hero, ceteris paribus. The implication is that as military technology has advanced, so that k has fallen, we would expect that each individual has a lower chance of becoming a hero.
Illustrating Our Results Using Supply and Demand
The usefulness of economic theory is to shape our understanding of important empirical phenomenon. As such, in the prior two sections we have outlined a list of empirical observations about heroism in combat and an economic theory of heroic action.
In this section we use the language of our model to provide an economic interpretation to the data using the convention of supply and demand. Again, the empirical aspects of heroism point to three facts: observed heroism is down, the likelihood of dying during a heroic act has risen, and the size of a campaign negatively affects the likelihood that an individual soldier will be heroic.
Aggregate Supply and Socially Optimal Demand for Heroes
To clarify these matters we now reformulate the equilibrium relationships detailed in the above theory into the aggregate supply and demand for heroes. that the curve shifts to the left for increases in α 1 and V, and to the right for increases in α 2 , and k. Note that, as stated above, ∂p*/∂n is negative and ∂np*/∂n is likely to be negative. In words, an increase in the utility from living and from the disutility of acting heroically will lower the expected supply of heroes for any given level of public subsidy, shifting the EH S schedule to the left. Moreover, if the number of bombs increases, or the private disutility form insufficient public actions rises, the expected supply of heroes rises and the EH S curve shifts to the right.
In addition, we can represent the optimal level of public reward, g*, using this diagram. To accomplish this, we need to augment the graph to include the socially optimal number of heroes, or the socially optimal demand for heroes. This is straightforward as the optimal number of heroes is equal to k -the number of bombs -as seen from Proposition 3. Pictorially it is a vertical line such that the expected number of heroes equal to k, and it denoted by E(H*) in Figure 5 . Note that the optimal public subsidy is the value of g where E(H S ) = E(H*), namely g*.
Is the Decline in Heroes Due to Supply or Demand Shifts?
With these tools, we can now outline a set of explanations to the question of where have all the heroes gone? To make matters easier, presume for a moment that the technology of military combat is such that heroism is labor intensive in the sense that it takes a lot of individuals acting heroically in order to fully resolve a situation. This is the case of k>1 bombs. Further assume that the government has set the optimal subsidy such that g = g*, which is represented in Figure 6 as point A. Below, we will outline how shifts in the supply of and demand for heroes can be used together to explain the empirical facts outlined above.
The key to understanding how heroism has changed is to recognize how the technologies, general and combat related, have changed, and how this affects the equilibrium level of heroism. For instance, the nature of combat technology defines the optimal number of heroes required to resolve a situation, which fully describes the optimal public demand for heroes, E(H*). In addition, technology also defines the utility benefit from living, V, the cost to the individual from heroic action, α 1 , and the cost to the no acting individual if an insufficient number of heroes take action, α 2 .
For example, as technology rises throughout the world, wages and living standards rise which makes V rise. Moreover, superior combat technology has improved the destructive capacity and reliability of bomb-making, which means that heroes will become less likely to survive as α 1 rises. Indeed, as α 1 → 1, heroes receive no benefit other than the public reward for heroism, suggesting that the private reward for being a hero approaches zero --a payoff consistent with a hero's death. Everything else equal, One could easily make the argument that more efficient bombs will make the costs from insufficient heroic action also rise, though one could also argue that armor and countermeasures have made the collateral damage from bombs fall. All in all, if α 2 were to rise, this would shift the aggregate supply of heroes' schedule to the right which would lead to an increase in the number of heroes. By contrast, if it were to fall then this would move the schedule to the left, which would reinforce the declines in V and α 1 . While we cannot resolve how technology affects the collateral damage from an insufficient number of heroes, it is clear that what is important is that even if α 2 rises, this can be consistent with a decline in the number of heroes as long as the increases in V and α 1 lead the EH S schedule to shift to the left on net.
This explanation has been useful for two reasons. First, we showed that the decline in the number of heroes found in the data is consistent with the move from point A to point B due to shifts in the aggregate supply of heroes, which embody the equilibrium response by individuals to incentives based on a coordination problem.
Moreover, one of the reasons for the shift is an increase in the private loss of being a hero (absent the public reward), which is consistent with heroes being more likely to die (i.e. no private enjoyment from life). As such, we have used the model to explain two empirical facts about heroism.
However, one element to this explanation, using just shifts in the aggregate supply of heroes to explain the decline in the number of heroes, is dissatisfying for the following reason: the decline in heroes is sub-optimal from a societal standpoint. In other words, has the government just allowed heroism to slip, with a corresponding loss in welfare to society? While the decline in the number of heroes has been demonstrated for a fixed public reward equal to g*, an optimizing government would raise g* to g*´. We demonstrate this possibility in Figure 7 . In this case, the optimal number of heroes was re-established at an equilibrium point such as C. Has the government myopically neglected heroism and arbitrarily let the rewards to heroism fall, thereby undermining public welfare?
The temptation to pursue this line of reasoning is strong, and one could point to However, the explanation that the government has neglected heroism or somehow arbitrarily changed the standards for heroism is ultimately not compelling. Given the seriousness and solemnity surrounding discussions of military heroism, the argument that the U.S. government and others have let heroism slip is not convincing to us.
Rather, the model provides a positive interpretation for the decline in heroism by pointing to the fact that the labor intensity of heroism has declined. In other words, the number of heroes required to resolve a situation, i.e. the optimal public demand for heroes, has fallen. As shown above, a reduction in k shifts both the aggregate demand of heroes to the left and the aggregate supply of heroes also to the left. This scenario is demonstrated in Figure 7 , where the equilibrium expected number of heroes is now labeled by point D. The number of heroes has fallen as compared to point A, though the decline allows for both supply and demand factors, and the decline in heroes can be viewed as an optimal response by the government. Also note that the effect on the new optimal level of public reward is ambiguous and depends on the relative shifts of supply and demand.
Conclusions
The American Heritage Dictionary defines a hero as "a person noted for feats of courage or nobility of purpose, especially one who has risked or sacrificed his or her We develop a model based on economic incentives and explain this empirical phenomenon as a response to changes in economic incentives and combat technology.
Moreover, we demonstrate that while individual supply decisions are consistent with the observed decline in heroes, there is a case to be made that the government has accommodated this decline because combat technology has made combat situations less labor intensive. In other words, difficult situations can now be resolved with fewer heroes. As such, society may need fewer combat heroes.
Obviously, we are not claiming that arguments explaining heroism based on evolution, or arguments based on psychology or sociology are wrong or even misguided.
Indeed, there is likely a great deal to learn from these other disciplines. However, we believe that there is part of the puzzle that can be learned by analyzing these issues in a rational choice framework. It may be difficult, for example, to ignore that as incomes have risen since World War II, that this may decrease the incentive for individuals to behave heroically. We also believe that future research that extends the analysis by allowing for dynamics and learning about one's and others' behavior would be beneficial.
The purpose of our paper is merely to provide a starting point for such an investigation. 
